Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

The news is rife with stories of corporations and other organizations breaching contracts, both written and unwritten, with employees. Business leaders may behave unethically but expect absolute honesty and high performance from subordinates. Companies may limit work hours or vacation days and other benefits while increasing workloads. Despite clearly defined ethical codes, guidelines, and mission statements that promote ethical and fair treatment of employees, many organizational leaders commit ethics violations that, in turn, affect employee motivation.

ORDER ORIGINAL, PLAGIARISM-FREE ESSAY PAPERS HERE

In general, perceptions of fairness and justice can have a powerful impact on employee work motivation. According to Colquitt, Wesson, Porter, Conlon, and Ng (2001), employees’ subjective perceptions of justice in organizational settings are classified into the following four types:

  • Distributive justice relates to the fairness of outcome distributions.
  • Procedural justice relates to employee perceptions of the fairness behind the processes of distribution.
  • Informational justice describes the extent to which decisions that affect employees are accurately communicated.
  • Interactional justice relates to whether employees perceive that they have been given a fair voice in decision making.

To prepare:

  • Using the Walden Library, the Internet, and other news sources, research and select an organization that has been cited for either an ethics or a justice violation (Wells Fargo– articles attached)

Post by Day 4 a brief description of the (Wells Fargo)organization that you selected and the ethics or justice violation associated with the organization. Then, describe two factors that might have contributed to the ethics or justice violation. Choose which of these you believe the primary factor is and explain why. Then, explain how this primary factor might have influenced employee motivation.

  • attachment

    CanWellsFargoGetWell.pdf

    T O T A L R E T U R N T O S H A R E H O L D E R S (2006–2016 ANNUAL RATE)R E V E N U E S P R O F I T S E M P L O Y E E S

    W E L L S F A R G O 2016 COMPANY PROFILE

    F O

    R T

    U N

    E F

    IV E

    H U

    N D

    R E

    D 1

    3 8

    J U

    N E

    1 5

    , 2

    0 1

    7

    It was as if the bank had been infected by a virus—a bug that had transformed its retail unit into a hard-selling boiler room. Then scandal broke, followed by a reckoning. The question now is whether the 165-year-old company can heal its culture—and still wow shareholders.

    $ 9 4 . 2 B I L L I O N $ 2 1 . 9 B I L L I O N 2 6 9 , 1 0 0 7 . 5 %

    CAN WELLS FARGO GET WELL?

    25R A N K

    B Y G E O F F C O L V I N

    P H O T O G R A P H S B Y S P E N C E R L O W E L L

     

     

    Wells Fargo CEO Tim Sloan rehearses for a company town hall in May at the Pasadena

    Convention Center.

     

     

    F O

    R T

    U N

    E F

    IV E

    H U

    N D

    R E

    D 1

    4 0

    J U

    N E

    1 5

    , 2

    0 1

    7

    Stumpf, then Wells Fargo’s CEO, was calmly telling a House committee that the scandal was “absolutely immaterial.”

    In a narrow sense, he was right. The company would go on to earn $5.3 billion in the quarter following the scandal—and an- other $5.5 billion in the most recent period, ending in March— keeping intact a prodigious earnings streak that now runs to 18 consecutive quarters of profit above $5 billion, a feat achieved only by one other company in recent history: Apple. (See our chart on page 143.) Last year, Wells Fargo was the fourth-most- profitable company overall, trailing only Apple, JPMorgan Chase, and Berkshire Hathaway.

    Bank deposits are up significantly, reaching an all-time high of $1.3 trillion. And the company’s stock has blithely followed suit, climbing 20% from its fleeting dip in October. So, yes, with the exception of the exit of Stumpf himself (who abruptly retired in October), an outsider would be hard-pressed to see any signs of “material” fallout from ghost-account-gate.

    As former COO Tim Sloan, who replaced his old boss as CEO, told Fortune in May: “If we were to dial the time machine back to the summer of last year and say, ‘This is what’s going to hap- pen to Wells Fargo over the next six months: Could Wells Fargo continue to generate over $5 billion of earnings [per quarter]?’ I think it would be reasonable for people to say, ‘Well, that’s not gonna happen.’ But look what’s happened.”

    Indeed. And yet, as Sloan candidly attests, there was significant

    fallout from the scandal. Wells Fargo faces a lingering cost that the quarterly numbers don’t reveal. “From a reputational standpoint—how our customers feel about us, our team mem- bers, how other stakeholders feel about us—there was clearly some impact,” says Sloan, a soft-spoken 57-year-old Michigan- der who, before joining the C-suite, worked on the business- banking side of the company. Data backs him up. Perenni- ally ranked by its corporate peers as one of the World’s Most Admired Companies (it was No. 25 on Fortune’s 2016 roster of all-stars), Wells Fargo didn’t make the list at all this year. Like- wise, the bank’s ranking in Harris Poll’s latest survey of corporate reputations among the general public has plunged from 70th to 99th place among the 100 “most visible” companies, above only Takata, whose defective airbags have been implicated in several deaths, according to the U.S. government. It’s “the largest drop ever measured” in the reputation poll’s 18-year history, Harris says. Some cities, moreover, have deemed Wells Fargo so toxic these days that they have said they’ll refrain from conducting new business with the bank.

    As this story was closing in early June, a federal judge in San Francisco was reviewing—and looked likely to approve—Wells Fargo’s proposed $142 million settlement of a class-action lawsuit brought by consumers over the phony accounts. Ad- ditional cases, including lawsuits brought by Wells Fargo employees, shareholders, and others, remain unresolved and could prove expensive. The company’s latest estimates of “rea- sonably possible” litigation losses range as high as $2 billion. Compounding the risk, federal and state prosecutors have been asking the company for information and could still decide to

    WHEN NEWS of the Wells Fargo fake- accounts scandal broke this past Septem- ber, the company’s stock responded as it had for much of the year: It rose.

    A U.S. congressman would soon label the bank “a criminal enterprise,” late- night television hosts would bash it merci- lessly, and plaintiffs would file lawsuits that the company recently estimated could cost it billions of dollars. Yet on that Thursday in September—as one of the stranger and more outrageous banking scandals in memory was being revealed to the world—Wells Fargo’s share price ticked merrily upward.

    Investors merely yawned at the revela- tion that its employees had created as many as 2.1 million phony deposit and credit card accounts for unwitting custom- ers—a “widespread illegal practice,” in the words of the Consumer Financial Protec- tion Bureau, that provoked that govern- ment regulator to slam the bank with its largest-ever penalty, a $100 million fine; the bank also paid $85 million to settle with the Los Angeles City Attorney and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Wall Street analysts were as nonplussed as investors; none of the 30-plus sages who cover the company—No. 25 on this year’s Fortune 500—issued any urgent reas- sessments. Even three weeks later, with little break in the scalding headlines, John

    W W E L L S F A R G O H E A L I N G I T S C O R P O R A T E C U LT U R E

    P E

    T E

    M A

    R O

    V IC

    H —

    B L

    O O

    M B

    E R

    G /G

    E T

    T Y

    I M

    A G

    E S

     

     

    1 4

    1 F

    O R

    T U

    N E

    F IV

    E H

    U N

    D R

    E D

    J U

    N E

    1 5

    , 2 0

    1 7

    bring criminal charges. All of this continues to hang over the 165-year-old stagecoach company and could further tarnish its once-wholesome reputation.

    One measure of that concern—hollow though it may seem— was the shareholder vote at the company’s annual meeting in April, where several directors barely managed reelection despite the bank’s enviable profit streak. Chairman Steve Sanger received only 56% of the vote. “When you get just over half the vote and you’re running unopposed, something is wrong,” says Charles Elson, a Wells Fargo shareholder and director of the University of Delaware’s John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance. “The board needs to be refreshed. Everybody who’s been there more than five or 10 years should go.”

    Sloan, to his credit, has taken on the challenge with gravity

    and even some urgency. “We’re focused on remediating and fixing everything that we’ve broken, and then also building a bet- ter company over time,” he tells Fortune, emphasizing that the first task on that list is to rebuild trust with employees and cus- tomers: “It’s much more important for us to make sure we’ve got the right team mem- bers in place, motivating that team, and cre- ating that culture than it is for us to focus first on our investors,” he says. At least for now, Wells Fargo’s biggest and most famous shareholder, Warren Buffett, has declared his faith in the company, with Buffett’s

    BRANCH MANAGERS WERE TOLD THEY ’D END UP “WORKING FOR MCDONALD’S” IF THEY MISSED SALES QUOTAS.

    Former CEO John Stumpf waits to

    testify before the Senate Com- mittee on Bank-

    ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs on Sept. 20, 2016.

     

     

    F O

    R T

    U N

    E F

    IV E

    H U

    N D

    R E

    D 1

    4 2

    J U

    N E

    1 5

    , 2

    0 1

    7

    Fargo’s board in the wake of the scandal. For example, the bank’s branches weren’t called “branches”; they were “stores.” When employee turnover reached 41% in one 12-month period—worryingly high for a bank—managers reasoned that the number was normal for a retailer and thus no cause for concern. But high turnover meant many employees were extremely in- experienced—which became a compound- ing problem when it came to hawking additional banking services to customers.

    “Cross-selling,” it’s called, and virtu- ally all banks want to do more of it. Once a customer opens a checking or savings account, maybe he or she would also like an auto loan or overdraft protection or a credit card. The more products a customer has with a bank, the more money the bank makes and the less likely the customer is to leave. That’s why all banks cross-sell. But arguably no bank has ever done it with the fevered intensity of Wells Fargo.

    The obsession with cross-selling dates back to Wells Fargo’s 1998 acquisition by Minneapolis-based Norwest, whose CEO, Richard Kovacevich, adopted the more prestigious Wells Fargo name for the merged business. He urged employees to “Go for Gr-eight,” achieving an average of eight banking products per customer. This seemed an insanely ambitious goal; at most banks the average was two or three. But Kovacevich stuck with it. So did Stumpf, a Norwest banker who ran the re- tail bank before succeeding Kovacevich as

    Berkshire Hathaway apparently holding on to most of its 500 million shares.

    Key to fixing Wells Fargo is understand- ing how it got broken in the first place. “How could it be such a successful bank and get into such deep trouble?” asks Harvard Business School professor Bill George, a Goldman Sachs director, former Medtronic CEO, and Wells Fargo customer and shareholder. How could so many smart people have been so wrong for so long?

    It’s a critically important question, and Fortune spent several months trying to shed some light on the answer. The ending for this case study has yet to be written and may not be for some time. But the story so far does offer some sobering takeaways.

    One of those is a lesson for every com- pany. Harvard’s Bill George sums it up well: “No one can say this can’t happen to us.”

    E VERY TALE of corporate scandal be- gins with culture—and Wells Fargo’s culture, at least in one prominent seg- ment of the company’s business, made

    it the kind of place where frontline employ- ees could feel ungoverned and libertine enough to fabricate millions of customer accounts. It also created an environment where such behavior could be concealed, minimized, and willfully ignored by higher- ups. But the story is hardly that simple. The culture’s worst features were also, in their more benign forms, key to the bank’s knockout success, transforming it from America’s No. 9 bank in the late 1990s, operating mostly in California, to the coun- try’s most valuable bank for a time—and even, in 2015, the most valuable bank on earth, ahead of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Today it’s No. 2 globally, behind only JPMorgan Chase. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    That dichotomy wasn’t everywhere at Wells Fargo—but it was central to the ethos at the company’s retail banking unit, known internally as the Community Bank, which is the company’s biggest, most prof- itable segment as well as its public face.

    Leaders there didn’t think of themselves as bankers providing services but rather as retailers selling products, and they “regu- larly likened the retail bank to nonbank retailers,” says the investigation report of a special committee set up by Wells

    Carrie Tolstedt , the former head of the retail bank , “did not like to be challenged or hear negative information,” concluded a Wells Fargo investigation, conducted in the wake of the scandal.

    W E L L S F A R G O

    L O

    U IS

    L A

    N Z

    A N

    O —

    B L

    O O

    M B

    E R

    G /G

    E T

    T Y

    I M

    A G

    E S

     

     

    0

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    $6 billion

    WELLS FARGO QUARTERLY NET INCOME

    AVERAGE NET INCOME FOR S&P 500 BANKS EXCL. WELLS FARGO

    $5.5 BILLION

    $1.3 BILLION

    Q4 2012 Q1 2017 SOURCE: S&P GLOBAL

    (FISCAL YEARS) 14 3

    F O

    R T

    U N

    E F

    IV E

    H U

    N D

    R E

    D J

    U N

    E 1

    5 , 2

    0 1

    7

    CEO. And so did Carrie Tolstedt, another Norwest banker whom Stumpf considered “the best banker in America.” She ran the retail bank from 2007 until the company announced her retirement at age 56, six weeks before the scandal became pub- lic. “Go for Gr-eight” remained the retail bank’s stated goal until last year. One result of this hard-charging sales culture was that Wells Fargo became the envy of the industry, achieving towering dominance in products per customer: an unheard-of 6.1, vs. an industry average of 2.7. Bankers everywhere wondered how they did it. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    Every managerial program has a life span. Employees eventually figure out how to game the program, or the environment changes and it no longer serves a use- ful purpose, or it accomplishes all it can accomplish. All those things happened with “Go for Gr-eight.” But senior leaders seemed oblivious to these limits, and as the program intensified over many years, they did little to rein it in. Whenever a note of caution rang, the company’s Kafkaesque bureaucracy stifled effective action.

    An early warning appeared in the spring of 2002, when practically all the employees

    of a Colorado branch jointly gamed the program in an effort to meet sales goals, including by issuing debit cards that custom- ers didn’t ask for. The board report explains that firing everyone as required by federal law would have left the branch virtually empty, so Wells Fargo arranged a regulatory exception that allowed some lower-level workers to stay. Everyone else in the branch retired or was terminated.

    Such behavior—opening accounts or issuing products that customers didn’t ask for—was and is against the rules at Wells Fargo, and when the bank found employees doing so, as it increasingly did after 2002, it would fire them. Senior leaders believed they were thus addressing the problem. But unethical employees weren’t the cause of the dysfunction; they were mostly an effect of it. The problem was targets that couldn’t possibly be met and a high-pressure sales culture that made the typical car dealership seem like a meditation retreat.

    Many sales organizations report results every month or week. Wells Fargo branch managers in some regions had to report sales data every hour in calls with district managers. Branch manag- ers therefore leaned heavily on their staff to sell. Even tellers were supposed to sell products, in some cases at least 100 per quarter. Individual employees were constantly and publicly ranked against one another, as were branches, districts, and regions. At every level, from tellers up through district managers and their bosses, those who beat sales targets were celebrated, and those who didn’t were publicly humiliated, sometimes demoted, and occasionally fired.

    Training in “questionable sales practices was required or you were to be fired,” a former employee tells Fortune. “We were con- stantly told we would end up working for McDonald’s” for not meeting quotas, a former branch manager told the Los Angeles Times in 2013; another former branch manager said employees “talked a homeless woman into opening six checking and savings accounts with fees totaling $39 a month.” That newspaper article sparked an investigation by the Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney, leading eventually to the actions brought by that office and the others that were settled last September.

    “Managers constantly hound, berate, demean, and threaten employees to meet these unreachable quotas,” the Los Angeles suit alleged. “Managers often tell employees to do whatever it takes to reach their quotas. Employees who do not reach their quotas are often required to work hours beyond their typical work schedule without being compensated for that extra work time, and/or are threatened with termination.” Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    The message was clear to everyone in the retail bank: “The route to success was selling more than your peers,” the board’s in- vestigation found—not profitability or customer satisfaction, but simply selling more products to each customer. Everyone knew the goals were sheer fantasy for many branches and employees. At some branches not enough customers walked in the door, or area residents were too poor to need more than a few banking products. Bank leaders called overall quotas “50/50 plans” be- cause they figured only half the regions could meet them. Yet no excuses were tolerated. You met the quotas or paid a price.

    The predictable result: fake accounts. Employees began issuing unrequested credit cards to existing customers or opening ad-

    H E A L I N G I T S C O R P O R A T E C U LT U R E

    MAKING BANK

    Wells Fargo has posted 18 straight quarters in which net income topped $5 billion—a streak surpassed by only one company in recent history: Apple. Over the past 15 months, just one of Wells Fargo’s banking rivals—JPMor- gan Chase—has outpaced it in profit.

     

     

    F O

    R T

    U N

    E F

    IV E

    H U

    N D

    R E

    D 1

    4 4

    J U

    N E

    1 5

    , 2

    0 1

    7

    who reported only to Tolstedt. The HR de- partment regarded employee bad behavior as an issue of training, incentive compen- sation, and performance management. The internal investigations and audit depart- ment looked for problems but didn’t pro- pose solutions; ditto the sales and service conduct oversight team. The law depart- ment’s employment section focused mainly on litigation risks from firing employees. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    These are only a minor fraction of the individuals, offices, committees, boards, departments, groups, task forces, and teams that examined sales problems in the retail bank. Each concerned itself with its assigned slice of the issue; no one looked for the root cause or envisioned big- picture consequences. “Bureaucracies love to lie to themselves,” says University of Michigan leadership authority Noel Tichy. “The hardest thing is to get a bureaucracy to be honest.”

    A T THE TOP of this bureaucracy was Stumpf, whose tepid response to information that should have trig- gered loud alarms is one of the most

    striking features of the scandal. Internally reported cases of sales gam-

    ing rose from 63 in 2000 to about 680 in 2004. In the second quarter of 2007, com- pany bosses received 288 allegations of em- ployee sales misconduct; that figure soared to 1,469 in the fourth quarter of 2013. Yet when Stumpf was told that the retail bank was firing 1% of its employees every year

    ditional deposit accounts with fake email addresses (such as “noname@wellsfargo .com”) so the customer would never know. A slightly safer tactic was to open ghost accounts for friends and family. The board’s investigation found a branch manager who had a teenage daughter with 24 accounts, an adult daughter with 18 accounts, a husband with 21 accounts, a brother with 14 accounts, and a father with four accounts.

    That was more than bad enough, but an even worse cultural problem was what happened higher up: nothing. Or at least nothing effective. As signs of trouble mounted alarmingly for years, top leaders consistently underreacted. The reasons were several, none of them unique to Wells Fargo or to banking.

    Ever since the Norwest takeover, the company had maintained a strong tradition of deference to the leaders of each business unit, who were urged to “run it like you own it.” Kovacevich called himself a “CEO of CEOs.” The theory was that everything, including risk management, worked better when decisions were made closer to the customer. Tolstedt, the retail banking head, was therefore expected to take full charge of any problems in her business, and the guiding standard of deference meant she was not pushed hard on the phony- accounts problem until late in the game. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    That culture proved particularly trouble- some with Tolstedt at the helm because she was “insular and defensive and did not like to be challenged or hear negative information,” the board’s investigation concluded. “Even senior leaders within the Community Bank were frequently afraid of or discouraged from airing contrary views.” (Tolstedt has not spoken publicly since leaving the bank, and she did not respond to an interview request from Fortune conveyed through her lawyer. When the board issued its findings, her lawyer said, “We strongly disagree with the report and its attempt to lay blame with Ms. Tolstedt. A full and fair examination of the facts will produce a different conclusion.”)

    Compounding the problem was a dysfunctional second line of defense: a corporate bureaucracy so sprawling that all its elements could plausibly evade full responsibility for the scandal. For example, the corporate chief risk officer had no authority over the retail bank’s risk officer,

    W E L L S F A R G O H E A L I N G I T S C O R P O R A T E C U LT U R E

    CEO Sloan at the May 16 Town Hall in Pasadena. Recently he refocused the retail bank’s incentive plan to reward employees for higher customer satisfaction, not product sales.

     

     

    505 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10022 • 212-838-7500 www.Sherry-Lehmann.com

    Enjoy Chablis this SPRINGTIME! Visit us online, at our Park Avenue store, or call us to

    learn more about our vast inventory!

     

     

    F O

    R T

    U N

    E F

    IV E

    H U

    N D

    R E

    D 1

    4 6

    J U

    N E

    1 5

    , 2

    0 1

    7

    as chairman and chief executive on Oct. 12. With the board’s explicit support, Sloan has since made broad

    organizational changes that are the infrastructure for culture change. Even before the scandal became public (but while the settlements were being negotiated), he had orchestrated Tolstedt’s retirement and her replacement by Mary Mack, who was running the brokerage business and who had come to Wells Fargo in its 2008 takeover of Wachovia. On Jan. 1 he instituted a new incentive compensation plan in the retail bank that pays employees on the basis of customer satisfaction and achievement of team goals, among other measures, but not product sales goals. The branches aren’t “stores” anymore; they’re branches. No one in the company gets evaluated on products per customer, and after almost 20 years, the company no longer reports that number to investors. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    Repairing a critical structural error, Sloan has fully central- ized the risk and HR functions, so the leaders of those depart- ments in the business units now report to their corporate chiefs without even a dotted line to the business unit head. He consolidated much of the vast risk-control bureaucracy into a new office of ethics, oversight, and integrity, accountable to the board’s risk committee. In February the board fired four more retail bank executives for cause, and in April it clawed back an additional $47 million of Tolstedt’s pay and an additional $28 million of Stumpf ’s.

    All of that needed doing before Sloan could finally start the culture-change project in earnest. He knows that culture doesn’t come from policy; it comes from leaders’ day-to-day behavior, and it cascades. What will he ask of his direct reports? Who will get promoted? How will frontline workers be evaluated, pro- moted, paid? Crucially important: What will happen when an employee calls the ethics hotline?

    “With 269,000 employees, it’s inevitable that there are some who will lie, cheat, and steal,” says the University of Michigan’s Tichy. “The question is what the leaders will do to discourage it, discover it, and deal with it.” Every employee will be watching for the answers.

    In trying to change its culture, Wells Fargo holds an advan- tage over most big, old, successful companies. As an amalgam of many banks, it doesn’t have a deeply rooted, oak-strong culture like, say, General Motors had when CEO Mary Barra launched her culture-change effort after the 2014 ignition- switch scandal. With Norwesters Stumpf and Tolstedt gone, and the main elements of the Norwest model—extreme decentralization and “Go for Gr-eight”—purged, Sloan faces an opportunity to create something new: a strong, companywide, uniquely Wells Fargo culture.

    It can’t happen quickly. “It takes years to behave your way out of a problem like this, to become the company you dream of becoming,” says Douglas Conant, who transformed Campbell Soup’s culture and rescued the company in the early 2000s. Wells Fargo today doesn’t need rescuing, just fixing—and it needs someone to instill the right culture. If Sloan remains CEO until he’s 65, and remembers that culture is what he’s creating with his every act every day for the next eight years, he could do it. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    for sales integrity violations, he saw it as excellent news because it showed that 99% were following the rules. He reiterated the point in an email to Sloan: “Do you know only around 1% of our people lose their jobs [for] gaming the system, and about 2/3 of those are for gaming the monitoring of the system, i.e. changing phone num- bers, etc. Nothing could be further from the truth on forcing products on custom- ers. In any case, right will win and we are right. Did some do things wrong—you bet and that is called life. This is not systemic.” (Stumpf, through his lawyer, declined a request for an interview.)

    Just as Stumpf and nearly everyone else focused too narrowly when looking inward (“This is not systemic”), they also focused too narrowly when looking outward. They figured, correctly but narrowly, that direct financial harm to customers from sales gaming in the form of unwarranted fees and penalties was insignificant in Wells Fargo’s overall results. But no one seems to have envisioned the reputational threat— specifically, to have imagined how news media and social media would react to the words “2 million fake accounts.”

    Which brings us to Sept. 8, 2016, when Wells Fargo announced it would pay $185 million to the City of Los Angeles, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The public response quickly made clear how badly the bank’s leaders had underestimated that announcement’s effect—even if shareholders were still mostly unalarmed. Discussion: Ethics and Justice Violation (Wells Fargo)

    As Senate and House committees sum- moned Stumpf to testify, executives and directors switched into crisis mode. “Tim [Sloan] really stepped up and grabbed the company by the collar even before John’s fate was determined,” notes David Car- roll, who runs the company’s wealth and investment management business. Within five days the company announced that all sales goals at the retail bank would be eliminated. By September’s end, the board had clawed back $19 million worth of stock awards to Tolstedt, denied her severance pay or a 2016 bonus, and determined that she should be fired for cause. It also rescinded—reportedly at the CEO’s own request—$41 million of unvested stock for Stumpf, who stepped down from his roles

    W E L L S F A R G O H E A L I N G I T S C O R P O R A T E C U LT U R E

    F E E D B A C K L E T T E R S @ F O R T U N E . C O M

     

     

     

    NEW APPLIED NOW accenture.com

     

     

    PARTNER OUTSIDE YOUR COMFORT ZONE.

    © 20

    17 A ccenture. A

    ll rig hts reserved

    .

    New is helping companies make outside collaboration a core competency, now.

     

     

    (855) 886-4824 | rstrepublic.com | New York Stock Exchange symbol: FRC MEMBER FDIC AND EQUAL HOUSING LENDER

    “In First Republic, we found a bank that is as passionate about our mission as we are.”

    I S A B E L L A S T E WA R T G A R D N E R M U S E U M Pegg y Fogelman, Norma Jean Calderwood Director

     

     

    © Time Inc., 2017. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be duplicated or redisseminated without permission.

  • attachment

    TeachingCaseWhatGetsMeasuedGetManaged.pdf